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I. Introduction 
This year, the Ohio courts issued several landmark decisions in oil and 
gas law.  These decisions help to advance Ohio’s position regarding several 
topics prevalent in the oil and gas law industry.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 * Melissa Grimes and Eli Humphries are associates and Tim KcKeen is a member in 
the Wheeling, West Virginia office of Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC. Andreah Frenn is a recent 
summer associate of Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017
766 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 3 
  
 
II. Statutory Law 
Between August 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017, Ohio has not enacted any 
major legislation pertaining to oil and gas law.  
III. Common Law 
Several Ohio courts have issued decisions which impact the landscape of 
oil and gas law in the state, most notably in relation to the application and 
interpretation of the Dormant Mineral Act.  
A. Dormant Mineral Act (DMA) 
1. Retroactivity of 2006 Version of DMA 
Following the enactment of the 2006 version of the Ohio Dormant 
Mineral Act (“ODMA”), there was confusion in the courts about whether 
the 2006 version would apply retroactively to previously abandoned 
mineral rights, or prospectively to rights claimed following the date of its 
enactment.  The Supreme Court of Ohio answered this question in Corban 
v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. when it held, in part, that the 2006 
version of the ODMA (1) applies to claims asserted after its effective date; 
and (2) specifies the required procedure for having dormant mineral rights 
deemed abandoned and merged with the surface estate.1   
The Court stated that the 2006 version of the ODMA is “not expressly 
retrospective, and it applies prospectively to all claims that mineral rights 
have been abandoned that are asserted after its effective date.”2  In practice, 
this ruling means that a practitioner need only check to see if there was a 
judicial ruling prior to the 2006 amendment, and, if not, then the 2006 
procedures would apply.3  Overall, the Court held that the 2006 ODMA 
applies to all claims asserted after June 30, 2006, even if the mineral rights 
were abandoned prior to the amendment.4  Thereafter, the Court either 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Corban v. Chesapeake Expl., L.L.C., 149 Ohio St.3d 512, 76 N.E.3d 1089, 1097-99 
(2016). 
 2. Id. at 1098. See, e.g., Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, 149 Ohio St.3d 282, 74 N.E.3d 427, 
430-31 (2016) (citing Corban in deciding that a claim for mineral rights made in 2012 is 
subject to the 2006 version of the act); Albanese v. Batman, 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 68 N.E.3d 
800, 804 (2016) (using the holding in Corban to state that a claim filed after June 30, 2006 
was subject to the 2006 version regarding procedural requirements). 
 3. Alexander T. McElroy, Avoid These Two Pitfalls When Applying Ohio’s Newly 
Interpreted Dormant Minerals Act: Practice Tips, 31 OHIO LAWYER 30, 31 (2017).  
 4. Corban, 76 N.E.3d at 1097-99. 
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affirmed or reversed several cases which were stayed pending the outcome 
of Corban.5   
Additionally, the Court held that the 1989 version of the ODMA was not 
self-executing and did not automatically transfer ownership of dormant 
mineral rights by operation of law.6  Rather, the surface holder of the land 
in question was required to bring a quiet title action “seeking a decree that 
the mineral rights had been abandoned in order to merge those rights into 
the surface estate.”7  Similarly, the Court held that the 2006 version also 
does not self-execute, but instead lists the procedural method required in 
order to establish the surface owner’s marketable record title in the mineral 
estate.8 Overall, the Supreme Court of Ohio specifically requires that the 
landowner would have commenced a quiet title action in order to obtain 
abandoned minerals under the 1989 ODMA. The quiet title action had to be 
filed before the ODMA was amended on June 30, 2006.  If there was not a 
quiet title action prior to 2006, this holding requires that the surface owner 
follows the procedure outlined in the 2006 version of the ODMA in order to 
assert a claim.   
Since the decision in Corban, the Supreme Court of Ohio has reiterated 
its holding. For example, in Walker v. Shondrick-Nau, the Court stated that 
“the 2006 version of the Dormant Mineral Act applies to all claims asserted 
after 2006 alleging that the rights to oil, gas, and other minerals 
automatically vested in the owner of the surface estate prior to the 2006 
amendments.”9  Similarly, in Albanese v. Batman, the Court expanded upon 
the holding in Corban and stated:  
[U]nder the 2006 ODMA, in order for a severed mineral interest 
to be deemed abandoned and vested in the surface owner (1) the 
mineral interest cannot be in coal, (2) the mineral interest cannot 
be held by certain entities, (3) no savings event can have 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Carney v. Shockley, 2016-Ohio-5824 (2016), aff’g, 2014-Ohio-5829 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2014); Eisenbarth v. Reusser, 2016-Ohio-5819 (2016), aff’g, 2014-Ohio-3792 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2014); Tribett v. Shepherd, 2016-Ohio-5821 (2016), rev’g, 2014-Ohio-4320 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2014); Thompson v. Custer, 2016-Ohio-5832 (2016), rev’g, 2014-Ohio-4320 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2014); Dahlgren v. Brown Farm Props., L.L.C., 2016-Ohio-5818 (2016), rev’g, 
2014-Ohio-4001 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014); Swartz v. Householder, 2016-Ohio-5817 (2016), 
rev’g, 2014-Ohio-2359 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014). 
 6. Corban, 76 N.E.3d at 1097. 
 7. Id.   
 8. Id. at 1097-99.  
 9. Walker, 74 N.E.3d at 431. 
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occurred during the relevant period, and (4) the surface owner 
“shall” have served notice and filed the required affidavit.10   
The Court noted that the word “shall” means that the notice and affidavit 
obligations are mandatory, further exemplifying the fact that the 2006 
ODMA provides procedural requirements.11 
In Harmon v. Capstone Holding Co., the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Noble 
County that a complaint filed in 2013 was subject to the 2006 version of the 
ODMA.12 The court noted that “[a]ny attempt to declare mineral interests 
abandoned after June 30, 2006 must comply with the notice requirements of 
the 2006 DMA.”13  Therefore, because the appellants did not comply with 
the notice requirements set forth in the 2006 version and because they failed 
to provide notice to the interest holder of record, the court held that the 
mineral interests in question were to remain with the record holder.14 
Overall, this holding exemplifies the court’s intent to strictly adhere to the 
requirements of the 2006 ODMA for any claim made after its enactment. 
2. Delay Rental Payments 
Additionally, in Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., the Court 
answered whether the payment of a delay rental is a “title transaction” or 
“savings event” for purposes of the ODMA.  The Court answered this 
question in the negative and held that the payment of delay rental is not a 
saving event under either the 1989 DMA or 2006 amendment because it is 
not “a title transaction that has been filed or recorded in the office of the 
county recorder of the county in which the lands are located,” as required 
under Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 317.08.15  Furthermore, the Court noted that 
a title transaction is a transaction that affects title to any interest in land,16 
which cannot be said for a delay rental payment.17  In conclusion, the Court 
stated that “[b]ecause a delay rental payment does not affect title to any 
interest in land, occurs outside of the chain of title, and is not filed or 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Albanese, 68 N.E.3d at 805 (emphasis in original). 
 11. Id. 
 12. 2017-Ohio-4155, ¶ 18 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2017). 
 13. Id. at ¶ 13.  
 14. Id. at ¶¶ 15-17. 
 15. Corban, 76 N.E.3d at 1099. 
 16. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.47(F) (West 2017)). 
 17. Id. 
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recorded in the office of the county recorder, it is neither a title transaction 
nor a saving event.”18 
In Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C., an oil and gas lease 
contained a one-year primary term, a delay rental clause of $5,500 per year 
for deferring commencement of a well, and an addendum requiring the 
lessee to pay at least $5,500 to the lessor in any year that the royalty 
payments did not reach the $5,500 amount.19  Two wells were drilled 
within the first year; one well produced no gas, while the other well has 
produced gas since inception.20  In the years 2008 through 2013, annual 
payments to the lessor were between $4,200 and $5,400.21 The Supreme 
Court of Ohio held that the underpayment by the lessees of the minimum 
annual rental did not entitle the lessors to a forfeiture of the lease under the 
unrelated delay-rental clause because a well was drilled in the first year and 
therefore the delayed rental clause did not apply.22  The Court relied heavily 
on the plain language of the contract and the fact that there was not an 
express forfeiture provision in the “plain language” of the lease.  
3. Royalty Interest 
In Devitis v. Draper, the Seventh District Court of Appeals answered 
whether a royalty interest in an oil and gas estate is subject to abandonment 
under Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.56.23  Drawing parallels to the decision in 
Pollock v. Mooney, where the court determined that a royalty interest was 
subject to extinguishment under Ohio’s Marketable Title Act, the court held 
that oil and gas interests can be subject to abandonment.24  In addition to 
the parallel between Pollock and the instant case, the court stated that a 
royalty interest is “one stick in the bundle of the five attributes of a severed 
mineral estate,” and therefore it is an interest subject to abandonment.25 
4. “Heirs” Asserting a Claim Under the DMA 
In addition to questions surrounding the procedural applicability of the 
ODMA, many courts have also struggled with statutory interpretation.  In 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Id.  
 19. Bohlen v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C, 150 Ohio St.3d 197, 80 N.E.3d 468, 469-
70 (2017). 
 20. Id. at 470. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 475.  
 23. 2017-Ohio-1136 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2017). 
 24. Id. at ¶¶ 14-17. 
 25. Id. at ¶ 18. 
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situations where there were various claimants coming forth regarding title 
to mineral rights, the courts were required to rule on the meaning of the 
definition of “holder” under the ODMA.  According to Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 5301.56(A)(1), “holder” means “the record holder of a mineral 
interest, and any person who derives the person’s rights from, or has a 
common source with, the record holder and whose claim does not indicate, 
expressly or by clear implication, that it is adverse to the interest of the 
record holder.”26  In Warner v. Palmer, the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals emphasized the language “any person who derives the person’s 
rights from, or has a common source with, the record holder” in its holding 
that the definition of “holder” includes “heirs,” as “an heir can be a holder 
as his rights can ‘succeed to the rights of’ the record holder.”27  In practice, 
this holding means that heirs could potentially have standing to challenge a 
surface owner’s notice of abandonment.28    
B. Post-Production Costs 
In Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., the Supreme Court of Ohio 
declined to answer whether Ohio follows the “at well rule,” which permits 
the deduction of post-production costs, or some version of the “marketable 
product rule,” which limits the deduction of post-production costs under 
certain circumstances.29  Instead, the Court stated that an oil and gas lease is 
subject to the traditional rules of contract construction and therefore the 
rights of the parties are controlled by the specific language of their lease 
agreement.30  Therefore, the Supreme Court of Ohio has declined to issue a 
blanket ruling upon the issue of post-production costs and instead will be 
decided by trial courts on a case-by-case basis.  This case is notable because 
it again exemplifies Ohio’s position regarding the importance of basic 
contract law with oil and gas leases.  
C. Land Men as Real Estate Brokers 
In Dundics v. Eric Petroleum Corp., the Seventh District Court of 
Appeals upheld a Mahoning County ruling that landmen must be licensed 
real estate brokers to receive compensation for negotiating oil and gas 
                                                                                                                 
 26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5301.56(A)(1) (West 2014). 
 27. 2017-Ohio-1080, ¶ 25-26 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2017).  
 28. James A. Carr II, The Ohio Dormant Mineral Act: Notable Decisions, OHIO OIL & 
GAS ASS’N 10, 11 (2017). 
 29. 71 N.E.3d 1010, 1010 (Ohio 2016). 
 30. Id. at 1013.  
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss3/18
2017] Ohio 771 
 
 
leases.31  The opinion consists heavily of the interpretation of Ohio Rev. 
Code Ann. § 4735.21, which states in relevant part: 
No right of action shall accrue to any person, partnership, 
association, or corporation for the collection of compensation for 
the performance of the acts mentioned in section 4735.01 of the 
Revised Code, without alleging and proving that such person, 
partnership, association, or corporation was licensed as a real 
estate broker or foreign real estate dealer.32 
Furthermore, the relevant statute defines “real estate broker” as one who 
engages in certain specified conduct for compensation, such as one who 
“sells, exchanges, purchases, rents, or leases, or negotiates the sale, 
exchange, purchase, rental or leasing of any real estate . . . .”33  Therefore, 
the court’s decision focused on whether oil and gas rights are considered 
“real estate.” The court relied in large part on the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
decision in Chesapeake Exploration L.L.C. v. Buell to reach the conclusion 
that an oil and gas lease affects the surface estate, and thus an oil and gas 
lease pertains to real estate.34 Therefore, the real-estate-broker rule applies 
to landmen who are compensated to negotiate oil and gas leases.35  
IV. Conclusion 
As oil and gas law continues to develop around the country, Ohio has 
also evolved through both statutory and common law actions.  The 
decisions issued in this past year have already had a tremendous impact on 
oil and gas law and carry large implications for the future.   
  
 
                                                                                                                 
 31. 2017-Ohio-640, ¶ 26-27, 79 N.E.3d 569, 576 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).  
 32. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 33. Id. at ¶ 11 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.01 (West 2017)). 
 34. Dundics, 2017-Ohio-640 at ¶¶ 19-23. 
 35. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4735.21 (West 2017). 
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